This paper reflects on three relevant principles of democracy which are inherent to the contemporary society. These principles are modernity, the politics of recognition, and secular-
Cosmopolitan democracy: an option or a utopia?
As the product of western philosophical theory, cosmopolitanism is a synonym for modern democratic society. The idea of cosmopolitan democracy in the contemporary world is influenced by a completely different global historical and political circumstances than what the original idea of democracy and cosmopolitanism were influenced by in ancient Greece and other historical periods. Today, this concept is mostly understood in the context of (neo)liberal democracy, western countries, and global processes. Therefore, the struggle to conceptualize cosmopolitan democracy must be understood as a debate, on the one hand, about the further democratization of particular societies, and on the other hand, about the globalization of democracy itself. This underlines efforts regarding the criteria of democracy, including economic and social development, but also regarding the issue of social and moral val-Thirdly, democracy in its future cosmopolitan form implies creating the world government which will be above national and international laws, and above local and global politics. This paper examines the relevant principles of cosmopolitan democracy, inherent to nowadays society: modernity, the politics of recognition, and secularism. The main question it concerns itself with is the sustainability of those principles as a ground for the foundation of cosmopolitan democracy and influence on the further democratization of the human world.
The issue of modernity
Within contemporary theories of society, the notion of modernity is primarily defined as the characteristic of western societies and cultures which are described as "individualistic, democratic, capitalistic, scientific, secular and stable." 4 Contemporary society is faced with changes that some social theories explain by primarily emphasising the difference between modernity and modernisation, by what they mean stages in the development of human society, and changes the society passes through, not only historically but also qualitatively. Modernisation is commonly understood as "… historical process involving non revolutionary, intrinsically growing changes", 5 or more correctly as the "… general process of transition from traditional to modern society or the modernity which, from another side, implies belief in reason and rational action, capitalistic economy, recognition of individuals and their rights, democratic political organisation and social structure based on classic societal division." 6 Defined in this way, modernisation makes the general idea of modernity more specific, connecting it with concrete cultures and societies in their self-development. However, it appears that such definitions of modernity and modernisation are not clearly delineated, although one could perceive that modernisation is more likely the synonym for progress. Nevertheless, there is an essential difference between modernity and progress: the foundation of category "modern" is related exclusively to the western societies, while various stages of progress can characterise any (other) society seeking to achieve the status of being "modern". 7 Ulrich Beck, founder of the so-called theory of reflexive modernisation, emphasises two developmental levels of modernisation. First level is the stage of "common" modernisation, characterised by structural division of society into homogenous classes and layers which caused an important so- cietal transformation, particularly in fields of economy and politics, but also maintained many traditional societal forms. The second level is the stage of "reflexive" modernisation and it is primarily based on consequences of technological development, thus producing societal pluralisation and individualisation. 8 In his theory of modernity Anthony Giddens defines radical modernisation as the mutual action of globalisation and detraditionalisation. Individuals no longer act by relying exclusively on tradition and they base their decisions on choices between various alternatives. 9 Charles Taylor's definition of modernity describes the contemporary society as "… an amalgam of new practice and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanisation), new ways of life (individualism, secularism, instrumental rationality) and new forms of depression (alienation, insignificance, feeling of unavoidable social disappearance)." 10 Taylor emphasises, as an important fact for understanding the contemporary society, that human beings are different from one another in terms of cultures and values they create. According to him, these cultures make "different forms of humanity of humanism". 11 The difference between various cultures Taylor compares with shifts between losses and gains, not only in simultaneously existing cultures, but also in comparison between earlier societies and civilisations with the current ones. In relation to past societies and cultures modern human beings conceive present society positively, as a developed science, and a potential for freedom of self-determination, but at the same time as irreversible loss of our harmony with nature, and a loss of our sense of community. 12 Taylor particularly emphasises such basis of modernity and, at the same time, basic difference between contemporary world and past civilisations, derived from understanding the concept of morality. This is reflected in a view that human beings request respect, regardless of the forms in which this feeling is expressed. In the past, human beings that earned respect belonged to the specific portion of society, to certain classes of people. More developed civilisation, such as the current western one, includes the entire human genus under the principle of respect. The typical feature of the modern West is the universal submission of such human beings under the forms of right. In such way, the principle of respect becomes a part of legal systems, and at the same time it occupies central position in the human moral view. Universal rights, natural rights or human rights imply respecting human life and integrity in such a way that people are considered to be active co-workers in establishing and ensuring respect to which they are entitled to. 13 According to Taylor, modern thinking on fundamental characteristics of modernity implies an element of uniqueness and belief that modern societies (having values in mind) primarily rest on foundations of necessary and unavoidable renouncement from religion, spirituality, universal values, and nonnaturalistic metaphysics. Developmental changes in the past decades created new theoretic space for reviewing modernity in experientially more realistic and metaphysically more open way of understanding it. Changes in the practical functioning of societies seeking to achieve the epithet of modernity require new theoretical horizon, some common ground on the basis of the acceptation of multiple modernities. The main idea behind the thesis of multiple modernities implies that modernity, with its elements and forces, could be accepted, developed, and expressed in significantly different ways in different parts of the world, or/and between various communities living within the same societies. This idea implies that, while the long observed forces of modernisation are still in effect through strong historical changes around the world, some of its original theses about uniformity and standardisation have already been suspended, if not rejected. New understanding of modernity creates possibility for different societies and subcultures to be assessed as fully modern, although they still do not seem to be as highly modern society in the context of economy, social development, technology, or their relation to religion, culture, morality, and views on science and metaphysics. Having in mind a large number of non-western societies, including post-colonial and post-communist societies, as well as Asian and Islamic countries which are essentially oriented towards it but are still insufficiently prepared, or still "inappropriate" for the western model of modernity, it appears that a third solution, between blind copying and the complete rejection of "imposed model", is more than necessary. Even though the idea of multiple modernities is not clearly formulated and articulated in the sense of theory, Charles Taylor emphasises that cultural understanding of modernity implies that "… transitions to what we might recognize as modernity, taking place in different civilizations, will produce different results, reflecting their divergent starting points. Their understandings of the person, social relations, states of mind, good and bad, virtues and vices, sacred and profane, are likely to be distinct. The future of the world will be one in which all societies will undergo change, in institutions and outlook, and for some these changes will be parallel, but it will not converge, because new differences will emerge from the old. Thus, instead of speaking of 'modernity' in the singular, we should better speak of 'multiple modernities '." 14 Although the idea of multiple modernities is still inadequately developed, it is important to consider that practical changes initiated by different ways of achieving the status of modern society cannot be understood only as the series of institutional changes, but also as a cultural project, having in mind that, speaking about religion, science or morality, modern societies should be sustained by modern values accepted by modern people. Therefore, the main question of how can we spread democracy in achieving its cosmopolitan form, if there are still countries that imply a totalitarian ideology and systems, and societies still far from the status of modern, could be partially answered: by emphasising multiply ways of establishing and achieving modernity and local democracy, anticipating the unique transitional period and recognising it. 
The politics of recognition as a principle of cosmopolitan democracy
In his book Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor points out that the making of modern identity, the synonym of the modern society, is closely linked with the changes in broader sphere of practices (religious, political, economic, family, intellectual, artistic) that affect each other. It is very important that these practices are properly articulated as guidelines for the argumentation and recognition of identity. Taylor emphasises the need for recognition and affirmation of cultural diversity, related primarily to the proper ideological orientation, which through political means needs to ensure two things: fulfilment of individual need for recognition, and materialisation of individual right to be publicly recognised. Taylor argues that the politics of equal rights for recognition produce two, somehow different, and at the first sight contradictory political strategies. First strategy is the politics of universalism which emphasises dignity as a base for equal respect, and thereby merges with the base for the equalisation of individual rights. In accordance to this, all human beings are equally worthy of respect because each one of them manifests universal human potential, and possibility for a rational self-realisation. Second strategy is the politics of difference which highlights recognition of unique individual and/or group identity along with their mutual difference. This enables the political articulation of general perception that all human beings own certain capacity or potential, the one that forms and defines their identity, but this kind of politics request, as precondition for equal respect or recognition, the value based on the potential they own. 15 For some time now, the public institutions of western societies are under criticism due to inability to find long-term solution regarding recognition and respect for specific cultural identities. Liberal democratic societies and their principle of equal representation are those who primarily face challenges of multiculturalism and politics of recognition, as well as an issue of human rights and moral issues. In that sense, critics of multiculturalism are oriented mainly towards ethical neutrality of citizen rights, and focus mainly on individual freedom of choice, which, according to them, depends implicitly on a value stand. The politics of universal dignity itself, according to Taylor, was a necessary foundation for the birth of the politics of differences. The first step in this direction was made by the claim that all people are worth the equal respect. The second step accepts the fact that individuals form their identities within certain cultures, and in a dialogue with other individuals. In accordance to this, different cultures need to be respected as sources of individuals. If coexistence of individuals within cultures is recognised as such, following they own equal respect based on dignity, the parallelism requires equal respect for the cultures too. Taylor offers an alternative replacement for classical liberalism, which would recognise the universal applicability of certain rights but simultaneously ensure the accomplishment of common goals. This means that, apart from fundamental individual rights, all other rights can be legally limited in order to preserve collective identities. Primacy of individual or collective rights will depend on the assessment of concrete cases. In this way, liberalism is no longer just a simple procedure, rather it contains in itself very significant ethical prepositions, both for respecting an individual, and for the functioning of various groups within modern society.
However, a twofold dilemma emerges: first, is any kind of reconciliation truly possible between individual and collective rights beyond the violation of the universal principles of individual rights? In this respect, it is clear that a border between undeniable fundamental rights and other rights that can be negotiated is not clearly made, and it can depend on the value stand previously mentioned. That implies a presumption that the value stand should also be negotiated. Second, considering Taylor's request for consensus over highest moral goods within certain culture, a question to be asked is how to achieve similar consensus between various cultures, especially between the dominant ones and the minor ones within the same society or global society as such? Practically, it is difficult to achieve such a consensus due to possible moral prejudices, which sometimes can be kept under control precisely, and perhaps only, by cold minded procedures which Rawls calls capacity for justice, 16 and which, according to him, also form the one side of individual's moral power. However, even a variant of holistic liberalism proposed by Taylor, at the least, cannot ensure a neutral field in which people of all cultures could coexist. How and on which grounds can anyone make a level limit up to which an individual would be in favour of a compromise in relation to his determination for the rule of rights within liberal community? And can we, in such case, still speak about liberalism? When we speak about the issue of recognition, there are two aspects of one and the same view: on the one hand, socially regulative aspect provides, for every individual within the society, the right to be respected and recognised, regardless of the culture they belong to. On the other hand, when we speak about the (informal) system of values which appeals to collective identity we have in mind a relationship where an individual is not involved through legal duty, but rather the relationship is based on free decision and the relevance of claimed values. At this stage of recognition, the social dialog is unavoidable. However, it carries a new ambiguity: which standards should define the basis on which negotiations over value differences could be lead? Who should decide who is worth to be recognised and preserved, and who is not? Those questions suppose the necessity of the general system of value as a criterion for, at the very least, procedural consensus over making decisions in recognising the group uniqueness. Nevertheless, a tendency to conserve certain culture in fundamental way, outside the existing dynamics of internal social development, and thereby inhibiting "natural" development of identity, can equally result with side effects, as well as it can be caused by rigid assimilation. This is why it is more than necessary to look for a middle solution, like the one proposed by Kenneth A. Strike:
"… I think we need to strike a balance that leans more towards viewing multiculturalism more as the politics of possibility than as a politics of recognition. We should work to see the other, and the appraisal of the other's culture along with our own, more as an opportunity to learn and grow than as a threat to the worth of our identity. 
Cosmopolitan democracy as a secular age
In the year 1688, in his publication A Letter Concerning Toleration John Locke established the foundation for the division of religious institutions from secular ones in the area of governance. After more than four centuries this issue is placed at the focus of debates because of the global relevance of secularism as a political doctrine which in its origins is understood as a specificity of the West. If the armed and cold wars are nowadays substituted with wars for the domination of values (behind which remains the economic and political domination), the importance of the relation state-religion becomes more than evident. In essence, the issue of secularism today does not appear from the fact that it is a product of the West, hence for the same reason it is an alien to the non-western states. The issue is supported by the fact that secularism is often identified with the raise of the capitalist states, and by the evident differences between the states in regard to economic power and wellbeing. This situation produces, at the same time, distinction between collective identities perceived as superior from the one point of view, and as inferior, endangered and unprotected, from the another point of view. Furthermore, the contemporary issue of secularism is repositioned within the debate as the consequence of deep crisis that engulf modern society which is lately related to the religious fundamentalism, either as a threat to the prowestern societies, or as a cause for the same. But the issue of secularism is much more complex, in both speculative and practical aspect. It is a broader notion than just a political doctrine. Secularism carries along a more completed understanding of religion, politics and ethics. Although primarily understood as specific for the West, the relevance of secularism is emphasised from the both sides, from the side of those who advocate in favour and from the side of others who refuse it. Charles Taylor's understanding of secularism fully supports its relevance in modern age. Even though secularism emerged in early modernity period as a response to devastating religious wars, and as a possible solution for political problems of western Christian society, it is applicable to all modern societies, including the non-Christian ones. Taylor emphasises that secularism has legitimized the rise of modern national state in two ways: first, as an attempt to establish a minimum common ground between doctrines promoted by opposed religious groups; and second, as an attempt to define political ethics regardless of religious beliefs. Precisely, the second model is applicable in today's modern world. Similarly, Benedict Anderson's 18 perception of modern nation (state) as "imaginary community" emphasises the role of modern state as tasked to make citizenry the primary principle of identity, transcending various identities built on classes, genders and religions, and replacing conflicted perspectives through a unifying experience. This kind of transcendental intermediation could be understood as secularism. Secularism is not simply an intellectual response to the question on permanent peace and tolerance. It is a setting with which political medium (as the representation of citizenry) redefines and transcends certain and differentiating practices of the self, which are articulated through classes, genders and religions. This, according to Taylor, concerns us mainly as the issue of secular ethics, and concerns us in the context of the possibility to intermediate religious con-flicts through legal, neutral basis. In religiously diverse society, as claimed by Taylor, doctrine of secularism allows people to obtain various reasons for supporting an independent, secular ethic. However, in 874 pages of his comprehensive piece A Secular Age, Taylor argues about a standpoint according to which the more developed modernism, science, and democracy are, the preoccupation with God and spiritualism is more marginal. In accordance with his Catholicism and the belief that life loses sense without believing in God, Taylor emphasises that God is very much present in the world, and that this fact is clear to all those who allow themselves the openness of mind for moral analysis and refined sensibility in the place of traditional theology. According to him western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly built self-understandings and related practices, and it cannot be explained by the previous accounts on human life, but rather with a new way of understanding it. Therefore, instead of, as it is believed, God disappearing, God is now enlightening us everywhere, including in the daily life, work, marriage, and all the other spheres of human life. 19 According to Taylor, the proof that secularisation has not destroyed religion is in the fact that depths of humanism survived precisely as spiritual values. Taylor is also more than sure that the lack of consensus about moral sources, as a base for making a modern identity within modern society, imposes demand for value stability and sustainability, which can only be ensured through values which are continually provided (albeit in a new form of understanding) only through theistic base. Taylor's theory of modernity and secularism raised the following questions: a) how the idea of secularism incorporates the idea of religiousness; either by considering religion to be a cultural heritage or by understanding religion as a way of domination; b) how much is secularism secular (the issue of public versus private sphere); c) can secularism remain to be the basic principle of (cosmopolitan) democracy. Criticism of secularism today is focused on its relevance as theoretical and/or political solution. Some critics primarily emphasise that the secular attempt of eliminating public role of religious belief does not necessarily solve or eliminate the problems of fundamentalism. Moreover, denying religion as an ontological basement within a public sphere from the secular point of view, according to critics, can strengthen and intensify fundamentalism by evoking anger, frustration and insecurity among those who look at this denial as the hidden and illegitimate lack of tolerance of liberal democracy. Obviously, religion is very present in contemporary political, social, and cultural life, much more that the nonbelieving authors from the 19 th and 20 th centuries could imagine for the post-modern age. Even the most fundamental version of Islam, or the scandals with the paedophilia linked with the Catholic Church, could not decrease the influence of religion in a modern world. The influence is especially very strong in politics, and that is clearly proved by conflicts in Balkans, Chechnya, and Palestine during the past decades. Even in Russia, which was the oasis for atheism for six decades, the religion earned a prominent role in every part of social life. If we agree about the meaningful presence of religion in nowadays societies, the question is: what is the meaning of religion? Today, religion could be understood primarily in two ways: first, in the positive sense as an issue of cultural heritage, which new generation will use to understand their history, tradition, and arts. This should also be understood in a way of how human beings organise their spiritual and moral lives. In the negative sense, the issue of religious rise today is very much linked with the politics of domination, with imposing the values, and through and besides these values, with imposing political and economic power in the first place.
In accordance with the previously mentioned layout of questions, the second question of how much is secularism secular as such is relevant. If the separation of religion from state (in procedural and functional manner) is the typical characteristic of modern western societies, how are we to perceive the fact that there are formally secular states where, in court, one swears to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth over the Bible? The same applies in the case of presidential oath too, which, in accordance to separate competencies between civil public institutions and religious institutions, should be performed not over Bible, but over the constitutional document. There is also an example of extreme legal setting in which atheists in certain countries cannot run for the president of state. In the United States, in seven of its states atheists are prevented by constitutions to perform public functions. As a conclusion, even though all people are "equal before God", this does not appear to be the case before the law. The same question could be asked from another, ideological-political view, as the question of implementation of the fourth principle of political liberalism, the principle of the state neutrality (pluralism, tolerance, diversity), whereby liberal neutrality primarily implies the prohibition of state's interference into the issue of values. In its practical implementation, secularity means the following: states/institutions should be secular, but not necessarily societies. The issue of separation of religion from the state is the issue of the separation of individual rights from the public duties and actions. Secular public institutions should guarantee the right to believe, or not to believe. But religious power should be separated from political power. That does not mean that secularism is opposed to religion, but that it should be understood rather as a mechanism through which the open democratic society should survive. As long as religion will remain in the private sphere, far from the possibility to usurp the function of the state, and fairly threat freedom and pluralism, it will remain complement of the democratic culture. This imposes the third issue, the issue of the sustainability of secularism as the main principle of democracy. Let us discuss this through the example of the relation between religion and education in public sphere, and point out two issues: first, should all forms of religion be removed from the curriculums of public schools, and second, whether public schools should embarrass girls who wear the veil, burka or hijab? In Notes on the Death of Culture, Mario Vargas Llosa rightly asked:
"Should a democratic country, in the name of respect for beliefs and cultures, allow, in the heart of its community, institutions and customs (or rather prejudices and stigma) that democracy abolished centuries ago after great struggle and sacrifice? Freedom is tolerant, but cannot be so for the people who deny it with their behaviour, deride it and, all's said and done, seek to destroy it. In many cases, the use of religious symbols such as the burka and the hijab that Muslim girls wear to school are challenges to the freedom of women achieved in the West, which some wish to restrict, obtaining concessions and creating sovereign enclaves at the heart of open societies.
It is clear in this example that the democratic institutions should support the preservation of religion and customs, but only in a case that religion and customs do not weaken "… the basic principles of democratic life, such as pluralism, relativism, the coexistence of contradictory truths, the constant mutual concessions required to arrive at a social consensus", 21 and do not threat the laws of democracy. If the democratic institutions do not preserve their secular character, then democracy will be lost in either short or long term.
Conclusion
The issue of cosmopolitan democracy is essentially an orientation towards a larger human community, an orientation which includes by itself a consciousness on the political nature of such community. At the same time, it expresses dilemma regarding the concept of world citizen, which should be understood not just as a subjective feeling, or exclusively ethical issue, but in the political aspect it should be conceptualized as conciliation between key democratic principles such as human rights, and legal issues such as civil rights, at the cosmopolitan level. For a citizen, the consequence of cosmopolitanism implies being "subjectized into the uprooting", 22 but simultaneously it promises tolerance, openness, and empathy. Nevertheless, some of the essential problems, such as difficulties in reconciliation of universal key values with concrete social ones, issues of cross-cultural moral judgment, development of mechanisms, and procedures that should produce concrete answers to actual problems of globalization, especially the problem of accountability, as well as the issue of sustainability of current democracy principles, are some of the real issues which, jointly with the upper-mentioned dilemmas, justify the question whether cosmopolitan democracy is a real possibility or a utopia. From the perspective of scientific and philosophical way of thinking, and above all, regarding the contemporary practice, cosmopolitan democracy will for a while remain in the frame of utopian reality. 
